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and  structures  have  been  adapted  and  others,  while  economically  efficient,  may  have  been 
rejected.  
 























Beginning with  their  publication  of  Legal  Determinants  of  External  Finance,1  Rafael  La  Porta, 
Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  (“LLSV”) asked: “Why do some 
countries have so much bigger capital markets than others?”2 According to them, the answer 
lies  in  the  legal  environment  of  the  country—its  legal  origin.3  LLSV  conclude  that  because 
common  law countries have better  investor protection mechanisms and better enforcement, 
bigger capital markets are more achievable.4 They also find that the concentration of ownership 
of  shares  in  the  largest  public  companies  is  negatively  related  to  investor  protection.5  Their 
theories have led to a number of influential papers, either in agreement, or as a critique to their 
work—collectively  turning  LLSV  “into  the  most  cited  economists  in  the  world  over  the  past 
decade.”6 
 


















system  in  its  province  within  the  larger  Canadian  common  law  framework.  This  fact  makes 
Canada  an  interesting  jurisdiction  for  exploration  of  the  LLSV  theories,  conclusions,  and 
critiques. 
 





and  a  large  number  of  very  small  issuers.  For  example,  the market  capitalization  of  the  200 
largest issuers listed on the TSX accounts for more than 88% of the total market capitalization 
of all TSX and TSX Venture Exchange listed companies.9 Over 190 of Canada’s largest issuers are 




than  those  listed  only  in  Canada.12  Studies  also  show  that  the  cost  of  capital  in  Canada  is 
approximately twenty‐five basis points higher than in the United States.13 These differences in 
valuation  and  cost  of  capital  could  be  the  result  of  differences  in  the  quality  of  investor 
protection  between  Canada  and  the  United  States.  It  is  reasonable  to  attribute  these 
differences to investor concerns about Canada’s fragmented regulatory structure for securities, 
concerns  about  ineffective  enforcement  vis‐a‐vis  the  United  states,  and  concerns  about  the 
significance  of  large  number  of  controlling  or  major  shareholders  in  Canada.  These  factors 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Canada  (and  Quebec  within  Canada)  provides  an  excellent  context  in  which  to  explore  the 
nuances of the LLSV theories, conclusions and critiques on investor protection, capital markets 
and  legal  families.  Three  issues  are  explored  in  this  paper.  The  first  issue  is  how  and  why 
Canada  fared  relatively  well  (in  contrast  to  the  United  States  in  particular)  in  the  recent 
financial  crisis.  The  second  issue  is why  Canada  still  has  not  created  a  national  regulator  for 
securities, despite more than forty years of attempts to do so. The third issue explored in this 

























critiques  of  the  LLSV  studies  and  their  conclusions.  Part  IV  explores  the  case  of  Canada  in 
relation to  investor protection and capital markets.  It  first explores how Canada faired during 
the  recent  financial  crisis.  It  then explores  the debate over  a  national  securities  commission. 
Finally,  it considers the position of Quebec, as the only civil  law province, within Canada, and 





of  this  article.14  In  their  well‐known  1998  paper  Law  and  Finance,15  LLSV  looked  at  laws 






pertaining  to  investor  protection.  Their  goal  was  to  “establish  whether  laws  pertaining  to 
investor protection differ across  countries and whether  these differences have consequences 
for  corporate  finance.”16  In  order  to  reach  their  goal,  they  distinguished  between  common 
families of law within civil law (French, German, and Scandinavian), and those within common 
law  (British  colonies,  United  States,  Canada,  Australia,  and  India),  using  a  sample  of  49 
countries.17 While they acknowledge that legal scholars often disagree upon the definition of a 




The  measurement  of  investor  protection  was  done  by  looking  at  shareholder  rights,  anti‐







protection to their  investors  than do civil  law countries, while French civil  law countries offer 
the  weakest  protection.23  They  also  noted  that  the  ranking  is  roughly  the  same  for  both 




investor  protection  compensate  in  other ways,  such  as  having  quality  law  enforcement.25  To 
evaluate  the quality of  law enforcement,  LLSV used  five  criteria: efficiency of  judicial  system, 
rule  of  law,  corruption,  risk  of  expropriation,  and  likelihood  of  contract  repudiation  by  the 
government.26 From their data,  LLSV answer  their question  in  the negative.27 They ultimately 

















of  laws,  countries  tend  to  develop  substitute mechanisms,  like  ownership  concentration,  for 
poor investment protection.29 
 
However,  do  countries  with  poor  investor  protection  actually  suffer?  While  LLSV  had  no 
definitive  answer  to  this  question,  they  do  suggest  a  positive  association  between  the  legal 
system and  economic  development.30  In  subsequent  research,  LLSV  attempted  to  expand on 
their  findings.  In 1999, they set out to study the effect of protections on valuation and found 
















problem with using  regression analysis as a main  tool  is  simply  the  fact  that correlation does 
not equal causation, and that correlation can be misleading. For example, while no law in the 
United  States  or  United  Kingdomrequires  board  of  directors  to  be  independent  of 
management, correlation makes it seem like legal rules “caused” this independence because it 
is  the  norm  in  both  these  countries.32  Law  in  general  is  hard  to  quantify,  and  thus,  some 














numerical  comparisons.  The  critiques  include  the  argument  that  numerical  comparisons 
oversimplify  the  complex  legal  systems  that  exist  where  historical  context  and  institutional 
dimensions  play  an  important  role,34  as  discussed  further  below.  Furthermore,  law  is 
extraordinary  by  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  law‐and‐society  systems,  including  extra‐
jurisdictional  complexities, which need  to be  considered when  studying  the  impact of  laws.35 










could  be  seen  as  a  way  to  reduce  the  complicated  endeavour  of  comparative  law  into 
something that is more understandable and therefore useable.40 There are also arguments that 
law  is  no  more  extraordinary  than  any  other  social  science,  such  as  economics  or  political 
science,  and  yet  these  sciences  are  able  to  use  statistics  to  analyze  data  to  some  degree  of 
success.41  Finally,  since  the  study of  comparative  law  is  relatively new,  especially  in  terms of 
methodology, there are no set rules on how to conduct these types of studies.42 
 
In  addition,  it  is  argued  that  the  categorization  of  law  seems  arbitrary  and  the  distinction 
between common and civil law is not useful in terms of a law‐and‐finance analysis.43 As a result, 
some  have  suggested  a  more  precise  criteria  consisting  of  four  identifiers:  European 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colonization (colonizing power), language, relative importance of statutory law and courts, and 






a  binary  manner  as  being  satisfactory  or  not  satisfactory  since  it  is  often  in  the  middle.47 
Spamann has argued that there is inconsistent treatment in the coding, and when he corrected 





left  out  in  the  LLSV  2000  study.51  LLSV  1998  also  did  not  differentiate  between  default  and 
mandatory  legal  rules.52 Furthermore, many of  the shareholder protection variables have not 



























law  is not  the main  link—it only plays an assisting role.54 Perhaps one of  the more  important 
limitations is that the indices that LLSV create only provide us with a cross‐sectional view of the 
law at a point in time.55 When legal rules are coded as they have evolved over time, including 
norms  derived  from  takeover  codes  and  corporate  governance  codes,56  the  differences 
between civil and common law jurisdictions converge over time.57 Further, while using this new 
index,58 there was no link between shareholder protection and stock market development. This 




The  critiques  related  to  methodology  lead  into  a  discussion  of  context.  LLSV  have  been 
criticized for focusing largely on legal families and very little on the way by which the law has 
developed within the specific country.60 The context in which laws are developed is important. 
The history of a  country matters when  looking at how  laws are developed, as  it may help  to 
explain  why  there  are  similarities  and  differences  between  jurisdictions.  In  addition,  the 
political  economy  and  the  social  and  cultural  circumstances  of  a  country  are  important  to 
demonstrate  that  although  the  laws may  be  different,  the  effect may  be  similar  in  terms  of 
investor  protection.  This  may  be  especially  true  when  countries  are  at  different  stages  of 




the development of effective  law.62 She argues  that  “for  law  to be effective,  it must become 
part  of  the  institutional  fabric  of  a  society,  contributing  to  the  process  of  institutional 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innovation  and  change.”63  Formalizing  laws on  the  books  is  not  sufficient,  rather  it  is  “[o]nly 
when the law is used—when it is modified in response to changing demands or socioeconomic 
conditions.”  that  the  law  truly becomes operationalized.64  In  essence,  the  “success of  a  legal 







they  originated.66  It  was  suggested  that  while  investor  protections  relating  to  independent 
board members and the mandatory bid rule, which both originated in the common law, “may 
be  wellfitted  to  a  dispersed  ownership  regime,  they  may  work  less  well  in  systems  with 
concentrated  ownership.”67  The  view  was  that  “[i]ndependent  directors  do  little  to  .  .  . 
[improve]  majority‐minority  agency  costs  where  they  are  appointed  by  the  majority 
shareholder;  similarly,  the mandatory  bid  rule  can,  in  this  context, make  it more  difficult  for 




The  last category of critiques  in  regards  to LLSV’s studies concerns  the view that  legal origins 
cannot  be  the  only  explanation  for  investor  protection  in  capital  market  development.  It  is 
possible  that  norms  also  play  a  factor  in  this  equation.69  Legal  rules  are  rooted  in  an 
environment  where  norms  and  conventional  practices  play  an  important  role  in  the 
development,  implementation,  and  enforcement  of  laws.70  The  common  law  versus  civil  law 
argument  advanced  by  some  commentators  oversimplifies  this  complex  development.71 
Instead, perhaps non‐legally enforceable social norms, social cohesion, and signals72 can show 
that norms do matter. In fact, they matter the most as a practical substitution for law when law 


















transactions.  In  such  transactions,  businesspeople  have  a  choice  as  to  where  they  want  to 
conduct  the  transaction:  under  common  law  or  civil  law.75  Voigt’s  study  revealed  that  in 
structuring  their  transactions,  businesspeople  chose  American  law  less  frequently  than 
expected, while  choosing French and Swiss  law more  frequently  than expected.76  This  seems 







maintain a  level of profitability,  liquidity, and financial stability not seen in other  jurisdictions. 
The  Canadian  banking  system  has  recently  been  regarded  by  the  IMF  as  a  paragon  of 
international best practices.78 The World Economic Forum also recently ranked it the soundest 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than  other  jurisdictions, which  no  doubt  played  a  part  in  the  relative  survival  of  its  financial 
sector.  This  explanation  is  consistent  with  a  generalized  version  of  LLSV’s  thesis  that  law 
matters  (noting  however  that  LLSV  do  not  explore  legal  rules  in  banking  when  exploring 








as  the  Financial  Consumer  Agency  of  Canada  into  their  own  regulatory  framework  for 








The  historical  context  of  Canada’s  banking  system  has  played  an  important  role  in  the 
development  of  the  current  regulatory  system,  the  particular  legal  rules,  and  the  relatively 
conservative culture of Canadian bank management. A historical analysis of Canada’s banking 







banks.  The  Constitution  Act,  1867  subsequently  gave  the  federal  government  legislative 
authority  to deal with all  issues  related  to “Banking,  Incorporation of Banks, and  the  Issue of 
Paper Money”.84 However, Canada continued to have a decentralized banking system until the 













Several  large  bank  failures  in  the  1920’s,  including  the  Merchants  Bank  of  Canada  and  the 





stakeholder  destruction  and  ensure  stability  of  Canadian  banks.86  In  1933,  a  Royal 
Commission87 was established to study the Canadian banking system and determine whether a 
central banking  institution was needed.88 The Commission recommended in favor of a central 




One  important  aspect  of  the  BOC  Act  is  the  deferral  of  standard  setting  of  key  bank 
requirements to the “Office of the Superintendent” (“OSFI”). OSFI currently plays a role as one 
of six regulatory oversight bodies92 that regulate aspects of the banking system and acts as the 
main  banking  regulator.  OSFI’s  mandate  partially  explains  the  reasons  for  Canada’s  sound 
banking  system.  It  states  that  OSFI  was  created  to  contribute  to  public  confidence  in  the 
Canadian financial system by “supervising institutions and pension plans to determine whether 
they  are  in  sound  financial  condition . . .  and  are  complying  with  their  governing  law  and 
supervisory  requirements.”93  OSFI  has  traditionally  and  consistently  set  Canadian  bank 
requirements  higher  than  those  set  out  or  recommended  by  other major  economic  powers, 
including Basel II;he most relevant example of this  is the capital adequacy guidelines required 























An  important aspect of banking stability  is  the ability of banks to manage their capital during 





requirements of 4% Tier 1 capital  ratio and 8% total  capital  ratio.97 The United States have a 
Tier  1  capital  requirement  of  6%  and  a  total  capital  requirement  of  10%  while  the  United 
Kingdom followed the Basel II requirements of 4% and 8% respectively.98 After reflecting on the 
toxic assets that doomed many of the major  institutions  in the United States during the crisis 




OSFI  and  the CMHC exercise prudential  oversight  and  influence over mortgage underwriting. 






























and  the United  States  changed  their  rules  in  the  1980s  and 1990s  allowing banks  to  acquire 
investment  dealers  but  with  different  results.102  In  the  1980s,  Canada  allowed  commercial 
banks  to  acquire  and  own  investment  dealers.  Accordingly,  each  of  the  five  Canadian  banks 
acquired a major dealer as a subsidiary that then became subject to the regulatory framework 
governing  commercial  banks  in  Canada.  Independent  dealers  still  remain  in  Canada  but  the 
major players have been absorbed by the commercial banks. By contrast, when the four pillars 
were  dismantled  in  the  United  States,  some  of  the  largest  investment  dealers  stayed 
independent—Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns to name two—and continued to be subject 
only to oversight by the SEC, not by the U.S. Federal Reserve as a commercial bank. As a result 
of  the  bailouts,  Morgan  Stanley  and  Goldman  Sachs  agreed  to  become  chartered  as  bank 
holding companies, and are therefore under tighter supervision by the U.S. Federal Reserve.103 





A  more  conservative  culture  is  also  a  contributing  factor.  While  Canadian  laws  are  more 
conservative than international standards, Canadian banks tend to be even more conservative 
than  the  OSFI  regulations. While  OSFI  set  out  a minimum  Tier  1  capital  requirement  of  7%, 
Canadian  banks  have  been  at  9.8%,  several  percentage  points  above  the  regulatory 
requirement.104  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  average  capital  ratio  for  United  States  investment 
banks which was at 4% and for European commercial banks which was at 3.3%.105  
 





On  the other hand,  this  brief  discussion  also highlights  that  context,  norms,  and  culture  also 
play a critical role. Even though the laws set certain caps or ratios on the banks’ capital, most 
Canadian  banks  maintained  a  less  risky  capital  ratio  than  required  by  the  law,  reasonably 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reflecting a more conservative nature as a product of the development of  its banking system. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  all  Canadian  banks were  or  are  equally  conservative  or  that  they will 
necessarily  remain  so.  As  some  of  Canada’s  larger  banks  expand  internationally,  some  have 
been  more  exposed  to  the  United  States  credit  crisis,  resulting  in  large  write  offs  of  bad 






While  the  rest  of  the  world  is  discussing  the  merits  of  a  common  or  integrated  financial 
regulator in the wake of the financial crisis107, Canada continues with its long standing debate 
over  a  single  Canadian  securities  regulator.  Canada  has  thirteen  provincial  and  territorial 






achieving  agreement  on  its  creation.109  A  common  sentiment  throughout  all  attempts  at 





























broken  in  the  sense  of  regulatory  oversight,  it  must  be  improved  significantly  in  order  for 





In  this  part  of  the  paper,  I  argue  that  securities  regulatory  structure  matters  for  investor 
protection. LLSV, however, do not take into account regulatory structure (or securities law rules 
for  that matter).  Rather,  they  focus  on  legal  rules  and  specifically,  only  corporate  law  rules. 
While  corporate  law  is  not  unimportant,  it  is  based  on  a  system  of  self‐regulation,  where 
market actors must pursue litigation in the courts themselves. While corporate law remains an 
important  framework  of  protection  of  investors  in  private  companies,  securities  laws  are  a 
primary  source  of  investor  protections  for  public  companies  in  Canada  and  in  many  other 





regulator  and  that  political,  economic,  and  historic  circumstances  constrain  the  choices  and 
decisions that are possible. Most reasonable people would agree that  if Canada were starting 
from scratch  in designing a regulator  for securities matters,  it would create a single regulator 
for  the  entire  country;  however,  the  provinces  having  occupied  this  space  for  so  long  and 
Quebec having a special place in Canada result in a tremendous obstacle to the possibility of a 
federal  or  single  structure. A  related point  is  that  in  the  absence of  a  change  in  formal  legal 
structures  in Canada,  there have been  reasonable attempts  at  functional  changes, by way of 
harmonizing laws and streamlining processes to create, for example, the Passport system.115 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One  of  the  principle  debates  over  a  common  securities  regulator  relates  to  the  question  of 
whose  jurisdiction  does  securities  regulation  fall  within:  the  federal  government  or  the 
provinces?  In  Canada,  the  supervision  of  the  securities  industry  was  not  explicitly  given  to 
either the provincial or federal levels of government within the Constitution Act, 1867. Over the 
years, as the capital markets have grown, the provinces and territories have begun to regulate 
securities under  the “property and civil  rights”  clause of  the Constitution Act, 1867,116 which 
has resulted in each province and territory having its own securities regulator. 117 While there 
have been expert opinions118  indicating  that  the  federal  government  could assert  jurisdiction 
over capital markets, possibly pursuant to its power to legislate in respect of the “regulation of 




While  the  current  system  of  multiple  regulators  has  strengths,  including  a  local  presence, 
development  of  industry  expertise,  responsiveness  to  distinct  local  and  regional  issues  and 
innovation, there are a number of weaknesses.121 The weaknesses include enforcement, or lack 
thereof,  inefficient allocation of resources, coordination difficulties, and inconsistent priorities 
within  investor  protection,  and  policy  development.  There  are  also  costs  associated with  13 
securities  regulators,  including  duplication  of  costs,  cost  of  compliance,  time  delays, 































The  inefficient  allocation or  lack of  resources  is  another  criticism of  the  current  structure,  as 







Issuers  and  intermediaries  also  criticize  the  costs  associated  with  complying  with  the 
requirements  of  thirteen  securities  regulators.  While  public  companies  pay  fees  to  each 
jurisdiction,  fees  are  in  some  cases  paid  to  the  provincial  government,  not  directly  to  the 
securities  commission  for  their  use.  The  costs  of  complying with  thirteen  different  securities 
acts  or  legislation,  while  significantly  harmonized,  are  nonetheless  imposed  on  public 
companies. 
 
On  the  international  front,  Canada  is  not  represented  at  the  International  Organization  of 
Securities Commissions, but rather two of Canada’s largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, sit 
as members.127 The inability for Canada to have a single, consistent voice on the international 




political  will  of  the  federal  government  to  move  to  a  national  regulator  exists  for  several 
reasons.  First,  while  not  necessarily  efficient  or  cost  effective,  the  thirteen  provincial  and 
territorial securities commissions have taken a number of steps to harmonize their regulations 
and  streamline  their  processes, which  some will  argue  gets  Canada  functionally  to  the  same 
point  without  a  constitutional  challenge.128  Secondly,  similar  to  other  issues  that  have  a 
constitutional  jurisdictional element to them, the proposals  for a national securities  regulator 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have  not  historically  garnered  much  support  from  the  provinces,  with  the  exception  of 
Ontario.129 Quebec and Alberta have constantly expressed their disagreement with this strategy 
and  have  recently  indicated  that  they  will  bring  a  court  challenge  to  prevent  a  national 
securities  regulator..130  While  British  Columbia  has  previously  been  opposed  to  a  national 
regulator,  its  position  has  recently  shifted.  131Third,  the  political  will  to  create  a  national 
securities regulator has historically not been strong. The recent  financial crisis and a number of 




million  to negotiate with  the provinces  to establish a  common  securities  regulator, based on 
the report and recommendations of  the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation.132 Needless to 
say,  political,  economic  and  cultural  influences  have  played  a  role  in  the  development  of 




The  case  of  Canada  highlights  why  regulatory  structure  matters  when  it  comes  to  investor 
protection—corporate law cannot be considered in isolation without considering securities law. 






Canada  is  somewhat unique  in  that both common  law and civil  law operate within  the  same 
country.  The  federal  government  and  the provinces,  other  than Quebec,  follow  the  common 
law. Mixed  legal  systems  are  also  found  in  Louisiana,  Scotland,  St.  Lucia,  Puerto  Rico,  South 

















Africa,  Zimbabwe,  Botswana,  Lesotho,  Swaziland,  Namibia,  the  Philippines,  and  Sri  Lanka.134 
Civil law, which is based on a written “civil code,” covers only matters of private law including: 






law  jurisdictions.136  LLSV  also  suggest  that  common  law  countries  give  shareholders  and 





the paper  compares  shareholder  remedies and  rights  in  the Quebec provincial  corporate  law 





In  Canada,  the  Constitution  Act,  1867,  gives  the  federal  and  provincial  governments  similar 
legislative  authority  over  business  incorporation.  Each  government,  federal  and 
provincial/territorial,has  its  own  incorporation  statutes.  During  the  1970’s,  the  corporate 
legislative  framework  in  Canada  underwent  significant  reform  inspired  by  the 
recommendations  published  in  the  Dickerson  Report.141  The  purposes  of  this  reform  were 
threefold. First,  it attempted to offer a more pragmatic approach  in regard to the mechanics, 
operations and incorporation of companies. Second, it introduced a contractual approach with 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(“CBCA”)  that  was  enacted  in  1975.  Following  the  federal  initiative,  provinces  responded  by 
either enacting amendments to their  respective corporate  legislation or by opting to proceed 
with a reform inspired by the federal model. Quebec opted for the former by integrating Part IA 





refer  to  judicially  created  recourses  found under  the Civil Code of Quebec144  (“CCQ”) and  the 
Code  of  Civil  Procedure145  (“CCPC”)  in  order  to  fill  the  gap.  However,  the  judicially  created 
recourses lack the flexibility and clarity usually associated with those found under the CBCA.  
 
In  considering  investor  protection within  Canada,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  distinctions 




no  explicit  provision  giving  rise  to  a  derivative  action,  an  oppression  remedy,  or  a  recourse 
seeking a restraining and compliance order. In addition, the QCA does not offer the possibility 
for shareholders to exercise their right to dissent in the event a significant change similar to the 






to  situations  where  there  is  manifest  fraudulent  conduct  committed  by  the  concerned 
















individual(s).  In other words,  it may be more difficult  to proceed with such a claim under the 





Under  federal  legislation,  the oppression remedy  is  regarded as being a very powerful  tool  in 
providing shareholder protection. To this day, the Quebec legislature has not followed suit with 
its  federal  counterpart  and  as  a  result,  litigants  are  left with  section  33  CCPC  as  a means  of 
trying  to  bring  such  an  action  in  Quebec  courts.  Over  the  last  couple  of  years,  the  Quebec 
Superior  Court  has  been  more  receptive  to  the  idea  of  extending  its  superintending  and 
governing  power  to  offer  an  action  similar  to  the  oppression  remedy  used  in  common  law 
provinces. Even though the court’s power has only been used in relation to cases dealing with 
fraud,  some  judges  have  been  openly  considering  the  idea  of  broadening  the  scope  of  its 








Supreme  Court’s  decisions  help  to  unify  the  laws within  Canada  for  two  reasons.  First,  they 
have  the  power  to  interpret  both  common  law  and  civil  law  legislation,  and  second,  lower 
courts in all provinces must follow the Supreme Court’s decisions, to the extent the facts apply. 
 
This discussion reveals  that while Quebec operates a corporate  law framework within  its civil 
law system that on its surface provides legal rules that do not offer as much protection as the 
federal corporate law statute (or other provincial law statues), the Quebec courts have stepped 




for  shareholders,  and  new  governance  rules.150  Some  of  the  proposed  changes  relate  to 
protections of minority shareholders including new remedies in the event of abuse or inequity. 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Shareholders will have  the possibility of  tabling a  shareholder proposal at  company meetings 
and a minority  shareholder who disagrees with a major change made to  the structure or  the 
activities  of  the  corporation  may  be  able  to  demand  that  his  shares  be  repurchased.151  In 






law  impacts the growth of capital markets. As the three case studies  in Canada  illustrate,  the 
context  of  how  laws  develop  is  a  strong  indicator  of  how  and  why  laws  within  the  capital 
markets have developed the way they have. It is not as simple as delineating between common 




create  a  national  securities  regulator,  and  the  role  of  Quebec,  a  civil  law  jurisdiction, within 
federation  of  common  law  jurisdictions.  In  exploring  these  issues  it  was  clear  that  the 
development  of  various  investor  protection  laws  and  structures  over  time  in  Canada  (as 
opposed to a point in time as in the LLSV studies), and also by providing context which helps to 
explain  why  certain  rules  and  structures  have  been  adapted  while  others,  although 








conservative  nature  of  our  banking  system  which  allowed  Canadian  financial  institutions  to 
escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial crisis. Finally, the Canadian system is both 
structured  and  has  evolved  in  such  a  way  that  investor  protections  are  fairly  consistent 






                                                
151 Id. 
152 Reform of the Québec Companies Act: Bill 63, supra note 151.  
